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Nebraska "Grade A" Dairy RegulationA Study In Regulative Overlap t
Deryl F. Hamann*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1957, the Nebraska Legislature passed L.B. 584 which requires, after July 1, 1959, that all milk and specified milk products sold by milk plants in Nebraska meet what are known as
"Grade A" standards.The statute authorizes the director of the Department of Agriculture and Inspection to adopt by regulation "minimum" Grade
A requirements which are to "comply generally"2 with the 1953
edition of the model milk ordinance and code promulgated by the
United States Public Health Service.3
Although in terms only a regulation of milk plants, the statute
necessarily contemplates extensive regulation of the dairy farm.
Under the regulations, a plant cannot sell Grade A pasteurized
milk unless Grade A raw milk is purchased from the farmer for
pasteurization. 4 In order to produce Grade A raw milk, the farmer

tThe author wishes to express his thanks to Professor Ernest Feder of the
Agricultural College, University of Nebraska, and to Professor Allan
Axelrod of the University of Nebraska College of Law for their helpful
suggestions and criticisms. This article is part of a joint study being conducted by the University's Agricultural Economics Department and the
College of Law.
*A.A. 1953, Fort Dodge Jr. College; B.S. (in Law) 1956, University of Nebraska; former Editor and Executive Editor, Nebraska Law Review (19551957); presently Research Associate, Agricultural Economics, University
of Nebraska.
I Neb. Laws c. 370 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-263.02, .06, .07,
.08 (Supp. 1955).
2 Id. § 1, amending 81-263.02.

3U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Milk Ordinance and Code
(Public Health Service Pub. No. 229, 1953), hereinafter cited as USPHS

Milk Ordinance and Code.
4The USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code 22, 25-27 (1953) contemplates provisions for retail raw milk and for Grades B and C milk when communities are just beginning a milk control program. The regulations issued
under the 1951 Act were issued pursuant to a labeling statute for only

Grade A products. Infra note 11. The new statute recognizes only Grade
A milk, so no changes are necessary in the regulations.
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must submit to regulation as to cattle health, building and equipment construction, and sanitation standards. 5 There is no governmental penalty for the farmer's failure to produce Grade A raw
milk, but if he does not, the plants are unable to re-sell it as milk
or use it in one of the specified products, and will not buy it for
those purposes.
The 1957 Act is the first mandatory program on a state-wide
basis which attempts comprehensively to regulate the dairy industry. Not only are quality standards for milk prescribed, but
cattle health, building and equipment construction, and definite
sanitation methods are prescribed in elaborate detail for both the
farm and milk plant. The regulations call for inspection of each
dairy farm and each milk plant at least once every six months, and
a sampling and examination of milk and cream from each dairy
farm and each milk plant four times within every six-month
period. The statute permits the entry into Nebraska of milk
produced and processed under substantially equivalent regulations
in other states, without the necessity of continuous inspection by
7
Nebraska officials.
The distinction should be made between "fluid" and "manufacturing" quality milk. The statute only applies to the former.
Thus, butter, ice cream, and most cheeses are not within the definition of "milk products" as used in the statute, nor does this statute
regulate the production of raw milk or cream used in the manufacture of such products. 8 There is also an exemption in the
statute for the farmer who peddles his own milk to not over thirty
customers per day.9
The new Grade A law is not the first entry of the State into
the field of milk regulation. There are still on the books a number
of state statutes covering the dairy industry and a large number
of municipal milk control ordinances. It is the purpose of this
paper to examine the relation between the new statute and already
existing state and municipal legislation in the field. Before beginning the analysis, a general description of pre-existing milk
regulation seems useful.
5 Neb.

Grade A Regs. § 7 (1953).
6Id. §§ 5, 6, 7.
7Neb. Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.07 (Supp.
1955).

8 Neb.

Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.06 (Supp.
1955); USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code 35.
9Neb. Laws c. 370, § 2 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.06 (Supp.
1955).
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A.-

STATE STATUTES PREDATING THE

1957 "GRADE A" LAW

1. 1951 Grade A Labeling Law
It had been reported in 1951 that in some areas of Nebraska,
milk was being indiscriminately labeled and sold as "Grade A"
with no attempt at compliance with the prerequisites set out in the
USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code. 10 The Legislature then passed
an Act which required all milk and milk products labeled Grade A
to meet those standards." The 1957 Act amended the existing
statute and made it mandatory that milk and milk products be
labeled Grade A and be produced and processed in accordance
with the specifications set out in the model ordinance and code.
2. General Milk Statutes
- The State also has general legislation regarding milk and milk
products. In a subsection of the Nebraska statutes entitled: "Control of Dairy Industry"'12 is found a hodgepodge of rules pitched on
the general-level of forbidding the sale of milk or cream "that is
not pure, clean, and handled in clean utensils; or which was taken
13
...from any animal kept in a crowded or unhealthful condition."'
Nebraska also maintains a pure food law 4 patterned after the 1906
federal statute (which has been superseded on the federal level
for twenty years), and a "sanitary food law"' which governs an
assorted series of steps in the production and processing of food.
B. MUNIcIPAL

ORDINANCES

Before the Grade A statutes were adopted, many Nebraska
municipalities had adopted some sort of milk regulation. Requests
for copies of ordinances were sent to 129 municipalities in every
county in Nebraska. Seventy-two replied, and of these, forty-three
municipalities were found to have a milk ordinance. Of these
forty-three, twenty-eight had adopted and retained an ordinance
patterned after the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code. This model
ordinance is amended from time to time, and we found that the

10 Statement by Robert H. Miller, President of the Milk Dealers Association

of Holdrege, Nebraska. Hearings before Committee on Agriculture on

L.B. 333, Neb. Legis., 62d Sess. (Feb. 19, 1951).
"Neb. Laws c. 308 (1951).
12 Neb. Rev. Stat: §§ 81-229 to 81-263 (Reissue 1950).
1Id. § 81-235 (Reissue 1950).
14 Id. §§ 81-203 to 215 (Reissue 1950).
15Id. §§ 81-2,111 to 2;121 -(Reissue 1950).
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city ordinances using it as a standard ranged in vintage from the
1936 USPHS edition to the 1953 edition. The remainder had
ordinances which varied greatly, both in substance and in enforcement provisions.
One outstanding criticism of the Grade A statute is its lack
of correlation with existing regulatory measures. As will be developed later, it does not satisfactorily define the status of municipal legislation, nor does it entirely mesh into existing statutory law.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the problems and to
suggest changes to alleviate the confusion and uncertainty.
II. THE NEW "GRADE A" LAW AND MUNICIPAL MILK
CONTROL
A. BASIC POLICY FACTORS IN MUNICIPAL MILK CONTROL
Until recently, milk regulation has been carried on primarily
by the municipalities. This "historical accident"' 6 resulted from
the attitude of state and federal governments in the past that control of milk quality was a purely local matter with which the city
governments could cope. That the small unit of the municipality
should perform the inspection service for a national dairy industry
was described twenty years ago as "an extravagance in paradox."'1 7
In the absence of overriding state or federal regulation, the
setting of quality standards and inspection of supplies by municipalities is a legitimate exercise of the police power to prevent unfit milk from being sold for human consumption.
It is of course impractical for the health officers of each
municipality to inspect producers and plants in the four corners
of the nation or even the state to determine whether milk is acceptable for sale within their jurisdiction. Thus, in some states,
municipalities have placed limits beyond which they will not send
inspectors. This raises the cry of trade barrier. The claim is made
that under the guise of health regulation, the municipality is really
erecting economic walls to protect the producers and plants within
the immediate locale from competition by milk produced and processed in other parts of the state or nation.' 8 The same claim is
made when the municipality refuses to permit the sale of milk
16 Hamilton, Price and Price Policies 463 (1938).
'7

18

Id. at 462.
For recent studies of "trade barriers," see U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Regulations Affecting the Movement and Merchandising of Milk (Marketing
Research Report No. 98, 1955); Hillman, Rowell, and Israelsen, Barriers
To The Interstate Movement of Milk and Dairy Products in The Eleven
Western States (Ariz. Exp. Station Bull. No. 255, 1954).
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produced under the inspection of other health officials. The municipalities' position in answer to this may be (1) that the standards
of the other governmental unit are not as protective of health
as those of the local municipality, or (2) the local municipality has
no control over the adequacy of enforcement by the foreign inspectors.
Nebraska, under the new Grade A law, will have statewide
minimum standards, and milk not meeting such standards cannot be sold. Milk and milk products shipped into Nebraska under
a valid Grade A label are accepted for sale in Nebraska as of Grade
A quality, unless the Department of Agriculture and Inspection
determines that the inspection made by the shipper state is not in
accordance with the rules and regulations for Grade A milk in
Nebraska. 9 But this in terms only removes the necessity of submitting to the inconvenience and expense of inspection by state
officials. The question remains as to the power of the individual
municipality to impose standards of its own and to demand inspection by its own officers.

B.

VALIDITY OF EXISTING MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES

A municipal ordinance stands in the same position as a statute
insofar as it is subject to state and federal constitutions. E.g., if a
provision of a municipal ordinance constitutes an undue burden
on interstate commerce, it is void, just as a state statute would be
void.20 But a municipal ordinance, in addition to conforming to
constitutions, must also be harmonized with state statutes. The
state statutes demanding clean barns and pure milk have been on
the books for years. Superimposed on these general rules were the
municipal ordinances which established the standards for milk sold
within their jurisdiction. The question is: What is the standing
of these ordinances since the passage of the Grade A law?
1. Power of the Municipality to Legislate
When inquiring into the validity of municipal milk ordinances,
the first question is whether the municipality has any power at all.
There are two different types of municipalities: home rule and
non-home rule. The non-home rule city must have authority from
the state legislature for all municipal legislative acts. 21 The homerule city generally derives its power from its home-rule charter.

19 Neb. Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.07
(Supp. 1955).
20

Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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Municipalities of all population classes have been granted statutory
authority to regulate the sales of milk within their jurisdiction,
either expressly or through general power to secure the health and
welfare of the community. 22 The home-rule charters of all three
home-rule cities also grant such power to their legislative
Nebraska
23
bodies.
There is some authority for the proposition that the power to
regulate milk sold within the city does not grant authority to impose standards upon, or to inspect, dairy farms and plants located
outside the municipality, in the absence of express words to that
effect. 24 Most courts, however, assume the contrary without statement. Where the question is raised, it is almost universally held
that the power to regulate milk sold within the municipality implies power to state the conditions under which the milk must
have been produced and processed, and to inspect the sources of the
compliance, even though the sources be located outmilk to insure
25
side the city.

21

For a discussion of the concept that the municipalities have inherent

power in the absence of a delegation by the legislature, see: McBain, The
Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 Colum. L.
Rev. 190, 299 (1916).
22
Metropolitan: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 14-102(3) (7) (Reissue 1954) the power
to provide all needful rules and regulations for the protection and preservation of health, and to license and regulate the inspection and sale of
milk and other articles of food. Primary: H§ 15-236, 15-237 (Reissue
1954) power to make regulations to prevent the introduction or spread of
contagious diseases, and to secure the general health of the city. § 15-263
(Supp. 1955) gives a primary city power to make regulations to -secure
the general welfare. First class: H9 16-240, 16-246 (Reissue 1954) gives
power to make regulations to secure the general health of the city and
maintain the general welfare. Second class: H§ 17-123, 17-505 (Reissue
1954) give power to make regulations to secure the general health of the
city and to make regulations expedient for maintaining the welfare of
the corporation. Village: H9 17-207, 17-208 (Reissue 1954) give the village the power to make regulations to prevent the introduction and
spread of contagious diseases and to maintain the welfare of the village.
The village board of health may also enact rules and regulations to safeguard the health of the people.
23 Omaha Home Rule Charter § 1.03 (1956) grants all powers which are
granted by the state of Nebraska to metropolitan cities. Lincoln Home
Rule Charter, Art. II, §§ 28, 29, 50 (1949). Grand Island Home Rule
Charter, Art. 12, § 1, Art. 2, § 7 (1928).
24 Dean Milk Co. v. Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949); 14 A.L.R.2d
98.
25
Felt v. Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1269, 78 N.W.2d 857 (1956); Korth v. Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 261 Pac. 895 (1927); Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44
S.E. 717 (1903).
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Since all Nebraska cities and villages are granted the authority
to regulate milk sold within their jurisdiction, the effect of the
Grade A law on the ordinances passed pursuant to that power
must be determined.
2. Pre-emption and Conflict - State Versus Municipal Control
Where there are municipal ordinances, enacted pursuant to
statutory authority, and the municipal ordinance regulates a subject which is also regulated by statute, the following propositions
are considered to govern the question of the validity of the munici26
pal ordinance:
If the state statute is intended to occupy the field with which
the ordinance attempts to deal, the ordinance is invalid.
If the legislature did not intend to occupy the field, but the
ordinance conflicts with the statute, the ordinance falls. [Emphasis
supplied.]
A further distinction must be drawn between home-rule and
non-home-rule municipalities. In a situation where an ordinance
of a non-home-rule city would be void because overridden by a
state statute, if the ordinance in question is that of a home-rule
city it must be determined whether the matter is of local or statewide concern. If it is of local concern, the ordinance of a homerule city would remain valid, but if it is a matter of state-wide
concern, the state statute overrides the ordinance of a home-rule
27
city and a non-home-rule city alike.
It is rather difficult to predict what the Nebraska court may
hold to be of "local" and what is of "state-wide" concern. 28 Nebraska has, however, held that public health is a matter of statewide concern, 29 and milk regulation obviously has some basis in
public health. Milk regulation has been held, in other jurisdictions,
to be of state-wide concern, either to protect the public health, 0
26

Axelrod, Home Rule, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 224, 225 (1951). The discussion
there refers to non-home rule cities, but the rule is the same when a
matter
is of state-wide concern.
27
See generally: Axelrod, Home Rule, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 224 (1951); Rhyne,
Statutory Construction in Resolving Conflicts Between State and Local
Legislation, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 509 (1950).
28
For a discussion of the nebulous distinctions made between "local" and
"state-wide" matters, see Axelrod, Home Rule, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 224, 233
(1950); Winter, Municipal Home Rule, A Progress Report?, 36 Neb. L.
Rev.
447, 462 (1957).
29
Michelson v. Grand Island, 154 Neb. 654, 48 N.W.2d 769 (1951); Axberg
v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
30
Flagstaff v. Associated Dairy Products Co., 75 Ariz. 254, 255 P.2d 191

(1953).
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or to protect the economic prosperity of the state which would be
31
hampered if a municipality could set up "trade barriers."
Assuming therefore, that the Nebraska Court would hold regulation of the dairy industry to be of state-wide concern, the above
rules regarding pre-emption of the field and state-municipal conflict would be in effect whether or not the particular municipality
has a home-rule charter.
a. Occupation or Pre-emption of the Field
The decisions as to whether or not statutes occupy a given field
are not particularly illuminating or consistent. In Connecticut, the
state statute established a rather comprehensive scheme of dairy
regulation, which essentially forbade the sale of milk with certain
labels, unless established prerequisites were met. Thus, milk could
not be sold under a "pasteurized" label unless it was in fact
pasteurized, nor could it be represented as being taken from tuberculin tested cattle unless that were true. A municipal ordinance
required as an absolute condition of sale that the milk either be
pasteurized or be taken from tuberculin tested cattle. The court,
after examining the extensive state regulations, determined that the
state had occupied the field. Since the state regulations only demanded pasteurization or tuberculin testing if the milk were so
labeled, the municipality could not demand pasteurization32 or tuberculin testing as an absolute condition precedent to sale.
A recent Texas case appears to be contra. 33 The Texas statute set
up a comprehensive system of grades for milk, including both raw
and pasteurized milk. The municipality permitted only pasteurized
milk to be sold. This statute appears to be at least as comprehensive
as the one in Connecticut, but the court found no occupation of the
field and held the ordinance valid. No express legislative intent was
available in either case.
The published committee hearings pertinent to the passage of
the Nebraska statute do not reflect any particular awareness of the
problem.34 The statute itself contains two provisions which may be
relevant. It is provided that when a milk plant has been issued a
Grade A license by a municipality having a "substantially equivalent" ordinance that is "properly enforced," then the plant can
Meridian Ltd. v. Sippy, 54 Cal.App.2d 24, 128 P.2d 884 (1942).
Shelton v. City of Shelton, 111 Conn. 433, 150 Atl. 811 (1930).
:3 City of Weslaco v. Melton, 308 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1957).
34 Hearing before Public Health Committee on L.B. 584, Neb. Legis., 68th
Sess. (March 15, 1957).
31

32
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operate under its municipal license without independent state inspection. 35 This is not an adoption of existing municipal permits
merely to facilitate the inauguration of a state controlled inspection
system.3 6 The statute provides for much smaller state inspection
fees when the State's approval is based on a municipal license.3
This clearly contemplates a continuing inspection service under a
valid municipal ordinance. These ordinances at least are not invalidated by the state statute. As to ordinances not "substantially
equivalent" to the state regulations, it may be argued: (1) by continuing in effect those particular municipal ordinances, the legislature intended to invalidate all other municipal regulation, or (2)
the statute, by this provision takes express cognizance of the existence of municipal milk regulation, and the only step taken was to
utilize municipal health officers in the state inspection system when
they were enforcing "substantially equivalent" regulations. Although obviously cognizant of the fact that some ordinances were
not "substantially equivalent," the legislature took no steps to limit
the regulatory power previously granted. Thus, there is no intent
to occupy the field. These arguments are of course equally plausible
and equally inconclusive.
The same type of argument may be maintained on the fact that
the director's regulations are designated by statute as "minimum
standards." 38 It may be said: (1) by designating these as "minimum
standards" to be enforced over the state, the legislature recognized
that particular areas in the state might need peculiar additional
regulations, thus clearly not occupying the field, or (2) this is no
expression of legislative intent regarding municipal power, but
merely means that the standards do not prohibit the sale of milk
which is of higher quality.
There is nothing compelling a decision either of occupation or
that there has been no occupation of the field. The most that may
be said is that the power previously granted to municipalities has
not clearly been taken away.
b. State-Municipal Conflict
If the statute has not pre-empted the field, the next question is
whether an ordinance might conflict with the state law. Two situa35 Neb. Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-263.04, 263.07 (Supp.
1955).
36 See Flagstaff v. Associated Dairy Products, 75 Ariz. 254, 255 P.2d 191
(1953).
37 Neb. Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.07 (Supp.
38

1955).
Id. at § 1, amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.02.
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530

tions immediately present themselves: (1) the municipal standards
may be higher or contain additional requirements not found in the
state law, or (2) the municipal standards may be lower or not require all the sanitation methods prescribed under the Grade A regulations. Both may be found in the same ordinance. For example,
there may be an omission of sanitation practice requirements which
the state demands, but thie municipality may demand more butterfat or less bacteria than prescribed by the state standards.
The question is: does a municipal standard conflict with a state
standard if it establishes: (1) a higher or more rigorous standard
than that provided by the state, or (2) a standard lower than that
set by the state? As might be expected in the field of municipal corporation law, conflicting authority can be found on both propositions
among the states.
When a Kansas municipality forbade the sale of milk containing
less than 8.75% nonfat milk solids, while the state demanded only
8.5%, the court held that the ordinance was valid and did not conflict with the state law. 3 9 But when the state of Illinois forbade the
sale of milk in paper containers unless certain precautions were
taken, and an Illinois municipality forbade the sale of milk in paper
containers altogether, the ordinance was held to conflict with the
state law in that it had forbidden what the state had impliedly permitted.

40

The state of Missouri forbade the sale of milk containing less
than 8.75% nonfat milk solids, and St. Louis plac.ed its standard at
8.5%. Held: the municipal ordinance was valid, and a violation
thereof was punishable. 41 The court reasoned that the lower municipal standard was not in the nature of an authorization to sell in
violation of the state law. It did not permit or invite a violation of

39 Kansas City v. Henre, 96 Kan. 794, 797, 153 Pac. 548, 549 (1915). "An
ordinance enacted in the exercise of the police power is not necessarily
inconsistent with a state law on the same subject because the city provides for greater restrictions or makes higher standards than is provided
or made by the statute." Accord: Ex parte Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac.
517 (1909).
40 Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. Chicago, 122 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd. 316
U.S. 168 (1942) on the ground that the identical issues were pending in
the state courts, and the federal courts should have stayed decision pending the construction to be determined by the state court. The state decision was contra. Dean Milk Co. v. Chicago, 385 Ill. 565, 53 N.E.2d 612
(1944).
4
1 St. Louis v. Scheer, 235 Mo. 721, 139 S.W. 434 (1911); following St. Louis
v. Klausmeier, 213 Mo. 119, 112 S.W. 516 (1908).

MILK REGULATIONS
the statute.42 The California court, on the other hand stated the contrary: "If the city of Los Angeles had provided that milk might be
vended which contained less per centum of milk fats than that
exacted by
the state law, there would be presented a plain case of
4
conflict." 3
It is difficult to see how the lower standard of a*municipality
can conflict with a state law. The idea apparently is that the ordinance permits what the statute prohibits. Upon slight reflection,
however, this is obviously not the case. The fact that the municipality forbids the sale of milk with less than 8.5% nonfat milk solids,
while the state forbids the sale of milk with less than 8.75% in no
way interferes with the state's ability to prosecute an operator selling milk with 8.6%.44 This argument is a mere technical defense on
the part of a person prosecuted under the city ordinance for selling
products not even meeting the lower standard.
As to the matter of higher municipal standards, the technical
argument, on its face, at least appears more acceptable. If the state
sets a particular standard, one may feel entitled to sell if he meets
that standard, and that if the municipality sets higher standards, it
is in effect prohibiting what the statute permitted. The Nebraska
cases on point are not very helpful. In the Phelps45 case, it is said:
A city with authority delegated to it to regulate a licensed
business, not inconsistent with the licensing statute, may properly
impose stricter regulations than the statute without being inconsistent with such statute. [Emphasis supplied.]
In that case, the complainant had a license from the State Liquor
Control Commission to sell beer and alcoholic beverages other than
beer in the same room, which license was issued pursuant to statute.
A Hastings municipal ordinance forbade the sale of both in the same
room. The court held that the ordinance was not "inconsistent"
with the state statute, and was valid. A later case, State v.
Kubik,46 appears to be squarely contra, although the court does not

42

43

St. Louis v. Scheer, 235 Mo. 721, 729, 139 S.W. 434, 436 (1911).
Ex part Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517, 519 (1909) (dictum); cited
with approval again as dictum, La Franchi v. Santa Rosa, 8 Cal.2d 331,
336, 65 P.2d 1301, 1303 (1937).

44

Note 39, supra.

45

Phelps Inc. v. Hastings, 152 Neb. 651, 655, 42 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1950). To
the same effect,, see Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W. 547 (1937).

Held: A municipality could punish under an ordinance which absolutely
forbade the sale of liquor to minors, even though the state statute only
made such sale punishable when the vendor sold to minors "knowing
them to be such." (Emphasis supplied.)
46 159 Neb. 509, 67 N.W.2d 775 (1954).
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expressly so state. In that case, the state statute provided that
nothing contained in the statute was to prevent the possession of
alcoholic liquor for the personal use of the possessor, his family, and
guests. An Omaha ordinance required a liquor license for a private
club to which persons brought and checked liquor which was then
served only to that person and his family and guests. In effect, this
is a stricter regulation than the state statute. The court found that
the municipal ordinance was "inconsistent" with the state law and
therefore invalid. No helpful generalization can be drawn from an
analysis of the two cases.
The wording of the statute which describes the director's regulations as "minimum standards" is also pertinent here. It may be
argued that since these are clearly designated as no more than
minimum standards, compliance with such standards does not imply
permission to sell in places where standards might be higher. Since
no express permission to sell is granted, a municipality has not prohibited anything the statute permits by imposing higher standards,
and thus there is no conflict. The opposing argument is the same
as that discussed under the "pre-emption" question, to wit: the use
of the word "minimum" means only that the standards do not prohibit the sale of milk which is of higher quality. The statute could
be held to imply that permission to sell is granted upon compliance
with the minimum standards, and an ordinance imposing higher
standards conflicts with the state law in that it prohibits what the
statute permits.
One application of this problem may be recognized in the situation of the farmer who peddles his own milk. The statute47 provides
that the act requiring all milk sold to meet Grade A standards does
not apply to the farmer who sells to not over thirty consumers per
day, but he must file certain reports. Does this imply an intent of
the legislature that this man is permitted to sell non Grade A milk
if he stays within the restrictions? If so, would a municipality be
forbidding what the state permitted if it demanded compliance with
its own Grade A ordinance?
Once again, all that can be stated is that it is not clear that
a municipal ordinance is void merely because it imposes standards
higher or lower than those of the state.
3. Interference with Liberty
Some cases raise a question on the position of municipal milk
ordinances with regard to constitutionally guaranteed liberties.

47

Neb. Laws c. 370, § 2 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.06 (Supp.
1955).
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Assume a municipal ordinance which requires that milk contain
3.5% milkfat. No one argues that this in itself would violate any
constitutional rights. But suppose also that the state standard is
3.25%. There seems to be at least some authority for the proposition
that the municipal standard is an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty - not because the municipal standard is in itself unreasonably high, but merely because it4 8 is higher than the state standard.
The New Jersey Court declared:
A local board of health, by incorporating in its ordinance abitrary
and unnecessary provisions, cannot preclude the prosecutor from
engaging in a lawful business, merely on the theory that his milk
and cream contains [sic] slightly less butterfat or the bacteria
count is slightly different.
49
The Texas court, in the same vein stated:
The 4% milk fat requirement of the ordinance in suit is, in
terms, a prohibition of the sale of milk lawful elsewhere, and so
viewed is void as an interference with the sale of property ....
The effect of the latter language is weakened by the fact that
the court further held that the state had occupied the field. But
the New Jersey decision cannot be fitted into either an occupation
of the field or a conflict classification. The court felt that this was
part of a scheme to erect trade barriers, and struck down the
municipal rules. As long as the regulations, in themselves, were not
unreasonable, and the state had no "conflicting" or "pre-emptive"
regulation, this reasoning altogether overlooks the concept of
municipal control over local affairs.
C.

EFFECT IF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE GENERALLY VALID

Under the foregoing analysis, it cannot be categorically stated
whether or not the municipal ordinances have been superseded. If
they have been overridden, then there is a single standard common
throughout the state. It would be useful, however, to consider the
results if it were held that the local ordinances are still in full effect.
1. Confusion of Standards
The first problem would involve the time-honored "trade
barrier" caused by multiple sets of standards administered by a
number of regulatory agencies. In the words of the New Jersey
court:9 o
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Urban v. Taylor, 144 N.J. Misc. 887, 188 A.H. 232, 233 (Sup.Ct. 1936).
Cabell's Inc. v. Nacogdoches, 288 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
50
Borden's Farm Products v. Somerville, 36 N.J. Super. 104, 113, 114 A.2d
788, 793 (1955).
49
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If it is, to be held that the local board may enact mandatory,
higher, or more stringent requirements than the State, then it must
necessarily follow that a chaotic condition would exist in so far as
meeting the requirements of every local municipality in the production, sale, and distribution of milk products.
The potential consequences on a plant desiring to sell on a statewide or interstate basis may be demonstrated by a brief comparison
of Grade A provisions with provisions found in Nebraska municipalities.
The Grade A regulations, in effect, only require inspection of
herds for tuberculosis every six years. t' There are municipal ordinances forbidding the sale of milk taken from cows not inspected
annually.5 2 The Grade A regulations require milk delivered from
the farm to contain not over 200,000 bacteria per milliliter,r' but
there are municipal ordinances setting the limit at 100,000. 5 4 There
is at least one municipality in Nebraska 55 which has a requirement
that milk contain at least 3.5% milkfat, while Grade A approval only
necessitates 3.25%. 6 The Grade A regulations permit the milk room
to be located in the barn,57 but municipal provisions may be found
which call for a separate milk house.58
Enforcement of such municipal provisions as these would tend
to restrict the sale of milk to small local plants supplying only that
one municipality. Large-scale plants selling on a state-wide or interstate basis might find it impractical to require all producers to have
cattle tested annually or to build separate milk houses. The alternative of segregating milk from certain producers who meet the
peculiar technicalities of each ordinance would be a further burden
and expense to such a plant. Likewise, a plant standardizing its milk
at 3.25% milkfat according to state standards would be forced to conduct a completely separate process to supply milk containing 3.57

51 Neb. Grade A Regs. § 7, Item lr (1953).
52
E.g., Oshkosh Municipal Code § 10(e) (Amendment 1947).
Neb. Grade A Regs. § 7 (1953).
E.g., Bayard Municipal Code § 10 (b). This ordinance refers to the sale
of milk for consumption generally, thus apparently including the farmer's
sale.
-Fremont Municipal Code § 8-125(c) (1953). This ordinance is rather
confusing, as sections 8-139 and 8-140 adopt by reference the USPHS Milk
Ordinance and Code.
56 Neb. Grade A Regs. § I-A (1953).
57 Neb. Grade A Regs. § 7, Item 8r (1953).
z; E.g., Oshkosh Municipal Code § 9 (Amendment 1947).
53
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milkfat for one community. These considerations may well make it
uneconomical for a large plant to market in that community.r9
Even when the municipality has adopted the most recent edition of the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code, there is no assurance
that the standards will be identical with those of the state. There
is no uniform control over enforcement policies. For example, many
dairy farmers are installing bulk tank and pipe-line milker systems. These are regulated generally by the Grade A provisions regarding "utensils." 60 A steering committee established by statute"1
has prepared an elaborate set of suggested rules governing these
specific installations. 62 The director of the Department of Agriculture and Inspection, however, has refrained from adopting these
suggestions. The reason is that the department does not wish to
force all the changes necessary to comply with these, and then later
require it all to be done over to comply with new standards which
are expected to be prormulgated by the United States Public Health
Service. 63 Compliance with these suggested regulations could entail substantial cash outlay 64 in addition to the equipment itself.
At least one municipal enforcement agency has taken them up and
demands compliance when such equipment is installed.65 This is
an additional requirement for the farmer selling to a plant that
markets Grade A milk within that municipality.
Another area of confusion appears when specific Grade A milk
59

Generally, see U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Regulations Affecting the Movement and Merchandising of Milk. (A.M.S. Market Research Report No. 98,
June 1955); Cabell's Inc. v. Nacogdoches, 288 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956).
6o USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code 62, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 90 (1953).
61 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.03 (Supp. 1955).
62

Recommended Policies Governing Handling of Grade A Bulk Milk from
Dairy Farm to Dairy Plant (May 27, 1957). Suggested Standards to Serve

as a Guide for the Installation and Cleaning of Cleaned-in-Place Sanitary
Pipe Lines (May 27, 1957).

with G. B. Flagg, Chief, Bureau of Dairies and Foods, De,partment of Agriculture and Inspection, Dec. 11, 1957.
64 For example, the recommended policies on bulk tank installation require
a certain milk room floor-area and gallonage production correlation, as
well as minimal clearance space around the tank. If the existing space
is not sufficient, apparently the farmer must rebuild. Port holes have to
be constructed in a certain manner to admit flexible tubing of the pickup
truck. Certain electrical switch connections are prescribed which will
without any doubt necessitate rewiring. Specific hot water gallonage requirements are set. See note 59, supra.
65 Conversation with L. A. Sanger, Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department.
63 Conversation
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products are defined for sale in the state, but not in the municipality. Under Grade
A regulations, the director may designate new
"milk products." 66 Pursuant to this power, the director has designated as milk products fortified skimmed milk67 and fortified vitamin-mineral milk.6 8
The above are in addition to those milk products defined in the
USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code. If the plant should, for example,
sell milk to which minerals have been added, in a municipality
which has not changed its ordinance to recognize these "milk products," the product would be "adulterated" if sold as "milk" in such
a municipality.69 Thus, in order to market the product on a statewide basis, he must convince not only the state officials, but also
the officials of each community with a Grade A ordinance that they
should designate his product as a recognized "milk product." In
some municipalities it is forbidden to sell milk to which "foreign
substances" have been added. 70 The question of whether these elements constitute "foreign substances" will be considered later with
reference to a state statute to the same effect.
2. Inspection by Local Officials
The question of inspection raises additional problems. Under
the State Grade A law, if a plant is licensed by a municipality or
another state which properly enforces a substantially equivalent
law, Nebraska will not demand inspection by State officials. 71 But
what if the municipality demands that no milk be sold within its
limits unless produced and processed under the scrutiny of local
inspectors? If local standards are equivalent to or lower than the
state law, it may be unreasonable to demand inspection by local

6 6Neb.

Grade A Regs. § 1-K (as amended Nov. 15, 1957); USPHS Milk
Ordinance and Code § 1-K (1953).
3
'1
Neb. Grade A Regs. § 1 H-3 (1953).
138Id. § 1 G-1; § 1 J-1 is the same for homogenized milk. The vitamin mineral milk designations are effective as of January 1, 1958.
OilUSPHS Milk Ordinance and Code § 1 M (1953). "Any . .. milk or milk

products... which if defined in this ordinance does not conform with its
definition shall be deemed to be adulterated." § 1 A defines "milk" and
does not include added vitamins and minerals. Since § 1 G makes a separate definition for Vitamin D milk, it would certainly not be contemplated that additional vitamins and minerals could be added and still
have the product come within the definition of "milk."

70

E.g., Oshkosh Municipal Code § 10 (a) (Amendment 1947).

7 Neb. Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957) amending Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-263.04, 81,263.07 (Supp. 1955).
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officers in the name of public health.72 The United States Supreme
Court, however, in holding that a municipality could not set fixed
mileage inspection limits which unduly restricted commerce, suggested that the municipality need not rely on inspection by other
officials, but could send out its own inspectors, and charge for their
services.73 This of course, relates to the constitutional issues involved in a dual system of inspection. If such local demands conflicted with the state law, or if inspection were pre-empted by the
state, under the concepts discussed above, the constitutional issue
would never be reached.
If the municipal standards are higher than the state, the municipality would have no assurance that its rules are met, unless it can
demand inspection by its own officials. The Grade A law contains
no provision authorizing Grade A inspectors to enforce municipal
regulations more strict than the Grade A requirements. Thus, there
may be one inspection by the municipal officers to ensure that
specific strict requirements are met, and another by the state to
insure compliance with the detailed sanitation and construction
standards of the Grade A law. If the municipality can demand
local inspection, this raises the question of limiting the area of
inspection. None of the Nebraska municipalities, whose ordinances
were studied, fixed any set limit beyond which the inspectors would
not go. Either they were silent regarding producers and plants beyond the limits of inspection, or permits were authorized to those
so situated on the basis of "proper evidence" 74 of the prospective
licensee's compliance with the ordinance. If absolute limits are set
administratively so as to exclude milk produced and processed beyond fixed mileage limits, there is presented this additional facet
of the "barrier" problem. On the one hand, it is argued that these
limits are practical necessities to keep the municipal officers from
going all over the state and nation to make sure the supplies are
satisfactory. 75 On the other hand, it is answered that this consti7

2 Falfurrias Creamery Co. v. Laredo, 276 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955);

McClendon v. Hope, 217 Ark. 367, 230 S.W.2d 57 (1950).

These two cases

hold that it is an infringement of the constitutional rights of plant or producer to demand routine inspection by local officers, when state officials
are enforcing regulations at least as strict as the local ordinance. The
municipal officers could satisfy themselves that the ordinance was complied with by assuring themselves that the state officials were properly
doing their job. A double inspection was not necessary to protect the
public health.
73Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
74 E.g., Oshkosh Municipal Code § 5 (Amendment 1947).
75 Witt v. Klimm, 97 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039 (1929).
See dissent in
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 357 (1951).
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tutes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce7 6 because
the municipality could charge for distant inspection or accept the
findings of foreign inspectors. It has also been held that such requirements deny equal protection of the law to those persons not
located within the favored radius7
As a practical matter it may be that these ordinances pose no
real threat because of lack of enforcement. Although this study
does not purport to reflect a complete collection of data regarding
enforcement, it appears that the ordinances are not uniformly enforced. Of the forty-two ordinances studied, twenty-eight were
patterned after the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code. The State
Department of Agriculture and Inspection only considered that
nine of these municipalities enforced their ordinance so sufficiently
as to permit plants operating under a municipal license to use the
Grade A label without regular state inspection.7 8 In checking the
codified ordinances of these municipalities, the impression became
rather strong that in many cases, the adoption of the USPHS Milk
Ordinance and Code was attributable, not so much to a desire of
the city council to improve the local milk supply, but rather to the
fact that the cities had selected a common author to "codify" their
ordinances. The codifier had apparently used this as his "formbook" in drafting municipal milk ordinances.
In two cases, the local officials included gratuitous comments
represented by the following:
The City's milk ordinances have been in our book for many years,
and for the past twenty years has [sic] not been in force.
The fact that some municipalities may not be presently enforcing
their laws does not seem any reason to declare the problems only
theoretical. Enforcement could begin at any time; particularly if
local pressure were applied in the traditional "trade barrier" sense
to exclude outside competition.
D. THE REFERENCE PROBLEM

Those municipalities which have ordinances based on the model
ordinance promulgated by the United States Public Health Service
are specifically recognized in the new state statute, and the plants
licensed by such municipalities can avoid state inspection if the

Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
Moultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. Cairo, 206 Ga. 348, 57 S.E.2d 199 (1950).
78 Conference with G. B. Flagg, Chief, Bureau of Dairies and Foods, Febru
ary 20, 1957.
76Dean
77
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ordinance is properly enforced. 79 But some of those very ordi-

nances are subject to serious doubt as to their meaning and constitutionality.
Along with the model "ordinance" is published a "code" which
is an interpretation for uniform enforcement of the ordinance. In
at least one municipality, the city adopted the 1939 ordinance, but
provided that it was to be enforced by the health officer in accordance with the interpretations in the "latest" edition of the code.80
Since the 1953 edition contains substantial changes 81 in both the
ordinance and code, there is the rather obvious problem of whether
the 1939 or 1953 provisions are to be followed.
In addition to the doubt as to the meaning of certain provisions, some portions of the municipal ordinances are of doubtful
constitutionality, because of the problem of delegation or abdication of legislative power. 82 It seems settled that legislative power
is not unconstitutionally delegated by adopting an existing document promulgated by a foreign agency. 83 But some Nebraska
municipalities have adopted the model ordinance and code with
the provision that ". . . any subsequent amendments or additions
to said code the ordinance, if any, are hereby adopted by the mayor
and council and also incorporated by reference herein when three
printed copies of said amendments and additions be filed in the
office of said city clerk from time to time."84 The adoption of this
type of referential ordinance is specifically authorized by statute.85

79 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.04 (Supp. 1955).

Note that many municipalities
have adopted the 1939 edition of the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code,
and the state regulations adopt the 1953 edition. As to whether those
municipalities which haven't adopted the 1953 edition possess "substan-

tially equivalent" regulations, the Department of Agriculture and Inspection has accepted, for example, the city of Kearney, which had, at the
time of acceptance, the 1939 edition. Conversation with G. B. Flagg,
Chief, Bureau of Dairies and Foods, February 20, 1957.
80 Beatrice Municipal Code c. 9, Art. V, § 9-515 (1941). The Lincoln Municipal Code, Group I, Division 9 (1951) contained the same provision until
amended on October 7, 1957 by Ordinance No. 6655.
81 See FSA Release, Jan. 27, 1953: "Summary of the Significant Changes
and Modifications Incorporated into the Milk Ordinance and Code-1953
Recommendations of the Public Health Service."
82
Prohibitions against the delegation of municipal legislative authority are
substantially the same as those against the delegation of state legislative
authority. Harrison v. Snyder, 217 Ark. 528, 231 S.W.2d 95 (1950); Peopl(

v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945).
83 State ex rel Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 147 N.W. 689 (1914).
84
Loup City Municipal Code, c. 9, Art. IV, § 1 (1942).
85 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 18-132 (Reissue 1954).
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The municipal corporation, however, is merely a subdivision of the
state created for the administration of government in local affairs, 6
and if the legislature itself could not delegate its power to a foreign
agency, it would be inconceivable that it could validly87 permit the
municipalities to so delegate their legislative power.
This adoption of the acts of a foreign body, in futuro, is open
to serious question. In an early case, the Nebraska Court considered
a statute which adopted the New York insurance forms. The court
said:",
That portion of the section which provides the form shall be
used as it "may be hereafter" constituted is too indefinite and
uncertain to be valid. It would leave the form to the future action
of the New York legislature or insurance commission, is surplusage,
unconstitutional, and void.
In 1935, the Nebraska Court had before it the case of Smithberger
v. Banning.89 The legislature had levied a tax on gasoline, the
amount and duration of which were dependent on future acts of
the United States Congress. The court held this an unconstitutional
abdication of legislative powers.
There seems little room for doubt that municipalities adopting
provisions as set out above have attempted to abdicate their power
to the United States Public Health Service. It is true that the purpose of the model ordinance and code is to permit uniform enforcement of a common standard,90 and there is authority for the proposition that the adoption of present legislation, together with future
amendments, is valid when designed to promote uniformity. 91 But
the adoption of the New York insurance forms as they might be
92
amended in the future would also have promoted uniformity.

86 Seward County Rural Fire Protection Dist. v. County of Seward, 156 Neb.
516, 56 N.W.2d 700 (1953).
87 See note 82, supra.
88 State ex rel. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 291, 147 N.W. 689, 693 (1914).
89 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935).
9
0 USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code iv, v, vi, x, xi, xii (1953).
91 Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir. 1950).
92 In answer to the proposition that the statute had unconstitutionally delegated power to the insurance board because it was to prepare a form "as
nearly as practicable in the form known as the New York Standard," the
court said: "The form of insurance policy which the legislature adopted,
known as the New York standard, is a definite and well-known form of
contract. Its characteristics, terms and conditions are known and recognized by the legislature of New York and other states, and are familiar
to all carrying on the business of fire insurance." The court was not
willing to accept future amendments even in this case. State ex rel. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 287, 147 N.W. 689, 692 (1914).
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Nevertheless, the court summarily invalidated that portion of the
act which adopted for Nebraska future changes to be made by the
New York legislature or insurance commission.
It may be that the court could be induced to repudiate its prior
decisions. The United States Public Health Service is no doubt
better qualified to establish health regulations than the usual group
of businessmen who comprise the city council. Since milk is a
rather homogeneous product, and is transported from state to state,
an argument can be made that municipalities ought to be free to
adopt a common standard which is automatically amended when
the Public Health Service makes an amendment. There is also the
basic argument concerning the question of delegation to the effect
that the city could always repeal its ordinance or specifically negate
adoption of a particular provision found to be objectionable. However, when the municipality adopts future amendments, as they are
routinely filed, the USPHS amendment would go into immediate
effect, and the industry would be subject to a particular regulation
even though the municipal legislators might have willed otherwise
had they been given the chance. During the interim period after
amendment is made by the USPHS and before the time that the
knowledge and realization of the import of the regulation is communicated to the municipal legislators, there has been a loss of
power to the foreign body. Except for this period, however, the
municipality really has not lost its power, since it can revoke or
specifically negate adoption of an objectionable amendment.
The many ramifications involved in the "reference" problem
are beyond the scope of this article. 9 3 It is only desired here to point
out the question which is raised by this form of adoption.
If that part of the ordinance which adopts future amendments
is unconstitutional, the remainder of the ordinance is probably still
valid in its original form. The test when part of a legislative act
is declared invalid is (1) does the elimination of the invalid portion
leave a complete existing law to be administered, and if so, (2)
did the unconstitutional portion "induce" the passage of the act
in its entirety? 94 Since the existing ordinance is a complete law
which can be administered, the first test is met. The adoption of
the future amendments would be no more of an "inducement" to

93For

recent treatment of the problem see: Poldervaart, Legislation by

Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 Iowa L. Rev. 705 (1953); Jaffee, An
Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 561
(1947).
94

Midwest Popcorn Company v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174
(1950).
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the adoption of the rest of the ordinance than was true in the insurance form case.9 5
This leaves the ordinance in its original form, unless and until
the municipal legislative body acts to change it. Since the state
Grade A regulations are based on the 1953 edition of the USPHS
Milk Ordinance and Code, there might arise a question as to
whether the local ordinance is "substantially equivalent" to the
state regulations." If not, the municipally licensed plants could not
avoid state inspection.
III. "GRADE A" AND OTHER NEBRASKA DAIRY STATUTES
In addition to the conflicts between state and municipal regulation, there is also some conflict between the Grade A laws and
existing state laws. For example, there is an old statute which
appears to require that cattle from which milk is taken for consumption be inspected and certified free of tuberculosis every three
years.97 The Grade A regulations permit the sale of milk from
herds located within accredited areas, which generally means that
the cattle need not be retested more often than every six years. 9
Since the entire state of Nebraska has the required accreditation,9 9
the old statute is obsolete, but it still remains on the books. 100
Another statute of early vintage sets the minimum milkfat for
fluid milk at 3%.101 That statute was referred to by the new law,
9 State ex. rel. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 147 N.W. 689 (1914).
9

1,For a comparison explaining the changes in the 1953 edition, see FSA
Release, "Summary of the Significant Changes and Modifications Incorporated into the Milk Ordinance and Code-1953 Recommendations of
the Public Health Service" (Jan. 27, 1953). See note 76, supra.
97 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-235 (2) (Reissue 1950).
98 Neb. Grade A Regs. § 7, Item lr (1953); USPHS Milk Ordinance and
Code, Appendix A, p. 148 (1953).

09 Conversation with D. F. Werring, Veterinarian in Charge, Animal Disease
Eradication, U.S.D.A., Lincoln, Nebraska, July 29, 1957.

"01'
From 1925 to 1937, milk could be sold from animals located within an
established inspection area without the mandatory inspection at stated
intervals. Just the inspection in conjunction with the area inspection
and accreditation service was required. Neb. Laws c. 9, § 1, p. 75 (1925).
That provision was deleted in 1937 when the stated interval was changed
from one to three years. Neb. Laws c. 7, § 10, p. 89 (1937). See also, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 81-236 (Reissue 1950). This requires the owner to pay inspection fees when inspection is required by § 81-233 (2) and the owner
is not under a supervised plan to eradicate the disease.
101 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-233(2) (Reissue 1950).
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and it was stated that milk plants must comply with it as a condition
for a Grade A permit. 10 2 The regulations which the director is
authorized to adopt must "comply generally" with the USPHS Milk
Ordinance and Code. 10 3 The argument can be made that this means
he is to adopt the model except insofar as necessary to align the
regulations with existing Nebraska statutes. Otherwise, he is not
given proper "standards" as to how he may deviate from the model,
and the familiar concept of improper delegation of authority appears. 10 4 The Nebraska regulations adopt a minimum standard of
3.25% milkfat' 0 5 in conformance with the model ordinance. Query
if the director was given power to issue a regulation setting a higher
minimum standard than that set by the existing state statutes?'"
If the legislators had thought of this, they probably would have
wanted the USPHS Grade A regulations to be followed on this
point, so that Nebraska milk could be sent to other states under a
Grade A permit. 0 7 There is, however, no coherent expression of
this intent, either in the statute or in the committee hearings'0 3
Another problem which is potentially more troublesome than
the last, is raised when flavoring, vitamins, minerals, and nonfat
dry milk solids are added to milk and milk products. The new
Grade A law requires specifically that all Grade A milk and milk
0
1 2

Neb. Laws c. 370, § 2 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.06 (Supp.
1955).
103 Id. at § 1; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.02.
104 State ex. rel. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 290, 147 N.W. 689, 693 (1914).
Held: Statutory direction to insurance board to adopt the New York
form of insurance policy "as nearly as practicable" meant "as nearly as
practicable considering the other provisions contained in the INebraska]
insurance code which in anywise are inconsistent with or modify the
provisions of the New York standard form. . .
105 Neb. Grade A Regs., § 1-A (1953).
106 State ex rel. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278, 147 N.W. 689 (1914).
The
"standards" test is still in current use as a method of declaring a carte
blanche grant of authority to be invalid. School District No. 39 of Washington County v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693, 68 N.W.2d 354 (1955).
107 This can be concluded from the provision which admits milk of other
jurisdictions under a Grade A label; presupposing that Nebraska's Grade
A milk would be reciprocally admitted in other states. If Nebraska's
milk were not required to contain more than 3% minimum milkfat, it
would not comply with the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code as adopted
by other states and a Nebraska Grade A label would not be sufficient
to justify admittance elsewhere. The Nebraska legislative hearings are
silent on the point. Hearings before the Public Health Committee on
L.B. 584, Neb. Legis., 68th Sess. (March 15, 1957).

108 Ibid.
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products meet the standards prescribed by section 81-233 of the
Nebraska statutes. 10 9 That statute provides:
No person shall sell or deliver for consumption as milk, cream,
or cheese, or have in his possession with intent to sell or deliver for
consumption:
(1) Milk to which water or other foreign substance has been
added .... [Emphasis supplied.]
The question is: to what extent may Grade A products run afoul
of the prohibitions against adding "foreign substances?"
The USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code makes specific recognition of milk to which Vitamin D has been added." 0 It also recognizes reconstituted milk products-that is, products to which dried
skimmed milk solids have been added, but provides that when the
state law does not permit the sale of such milk or milk products,
the latter provisions should be omitted."' In addition to adopting
regulations authorizing the addition of those ingredients, the Nebraska regulations now permit the addition of Vitamin A, Vitamin
Bi, Vitamin B2,2Thiamin, Riboflavin, Niacin, Iron, and Iodine to certain products."
This article does not intend to express any opinion as to the
necessity or desirability of the addition of such items. The USPHS
Milk Ordinance and Code generally opposes the addition of vitamins and minerals other than Vitamin D." 3 For the purposes of
this article, the question is whether these ingredients are forbidden
by the statutory prohibition against the addition of "foreign substances." It may be that since the nonfat milk solids are taken from
milk itself, they are not "foreign" to milk and thus are not forbidden." 4 As to vitamins and minerals, however, it appears much
more questionable. If they are foreign, the specific reference to,
and adoption of, section 81-233 would preclude any argument that
the absolute requirements of the old statute had been impliedly
overruled by the later one. The validity of these regulations, and
the protection they afford to the milk plants adding such items is
open to serious question. Probably, however, these items are wholesome, and there is some doubt in Nebraska whether it is constitutional to forbid the sale of wholesome food. In striking down the
Neb. Laws c. 370, § 2 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.06 (Supp.
1955).
nOUSPHS Milk Ordinance and Code § 1 G (1953).
111 Id. at p. 4, footnote 13.
112 Neb. Grade A Regs. §§ 1 G, G-1, H-3, J-l, K (Revised Nov. 15, 1957).
113 USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code 33 (1953).
114 Op. Neb. Atty. Gen., March 5, 1952.
109
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Nebraska filled milk act, the State court held that the legislature
could regulate the sale of food to which non-natural items (coconut oil) had been added, but since the food was wholesome, its
sale could not be absolutely forbidden.115 The decisions on this
point are in conflict, and the United States Supreme Court held
contra in a case involving the federal filled milk act.'
This type
of constitutional argument would cut across the entire dairy control program. For example, it might be argued that raw milk is
generally wholesome. Therefore, the state may properly set sanitation limits for raw milk, but cannot entirely forbid its sale if wholesome.
IV. DESIRABILITY OF THE USPHS MILK ORDINANCE
AND CODE
It is not intended here to weigh the merits of the substantive
provisions of the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code. This ordinance
is the product of continuous study and revision. The 1953 edition
is the twelfth major revision since the first Standard Milk Ordinance
was published in 1924. These standards have been incorporated
into the Federal Specifications established for purchases by federal
agencies, 1 17 and are required for milk served on interstate carriers."18 The latest count shows that the Ordinance and Code serves
as the basis of regulation in thirty-four states and two territories.
1
It has been adopted by 478 counties and 1,399 municipalities."
The Public Health Service has set up, in cooperation with the
states, a rating system, which rates compliance with the milk
ordinance. This enables states or municipalities to import milk from
other areas without the expense of multiple and distant inspection.12 0 The federal marketing orders, which guarantee minimum

115 Carolene Products Co. v. Banning, 131 Neb. 429, 268 N.W. 313 (1936).
116

Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).

Specs. C-M-381e, HI 3.1, 3.5.1, 3.6 (1950); C-C-671b, § 3.1, 3.4.1
(1951).
118 42 C.F.R. § 72.165 (Supp. 1954) of the Quarantine Regulations gives the
"17Fed.

Surgeon General authority to approve sources of fluid milk products
for consumption on interstate carriers. The USPHS Milk Ordinance
and Code is the basis used in approving sources. Letter of August 6,
1957 from Harold B. Robinson, Chief, Milk Sanitation Section, Milk and
Food Program, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.
119 Letter of March 7, 1958 from Harold B. Robinson, supra.
120USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code 144 (1953) provides: "Subject to
laboratory tests upon arrival, the health officer should approve, without
his inspection, supplies of milk or milk products from any area or shipper
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prices to dairy farmers, supposedly do not establish sanitary or
quality standards. 12 1 However, it may be noted that the orders in
22
effect in Nebraska protect only farmers producing Grade A milk.1
There are those who maintain that the entire farm inspection
program (which is of course a vital part of the model ordinance)
is merely a hangover from an earlier stage of technological development-that is, before the advent of pasteurization. 12 3 A few
disease organisms are not killed by pasteurization, 124 and farm inspection may generally be said to guard against those. The argument is also made that the farm inspection and controlled building
and sanitation standards serve to preserve the aesthetic values of
milk, but recent scientific studies indicate that at least some of the
strict standards regarding barn and milkhouse construction are of
no real value in producing better milk. 125 There is some evidence
not under his routine inspection (1) when they are produced and processed under regulations substantially equivalent to those of this Ordinance, (2) when they are under routine official supervision, and (3)
when they have been awarded, by the milk sanitation authority of the
State of origin, a milk sanitation rating equal to that of the local supply,
or if lower than that of the local supply, equal to 90 percent or more,
on the basis of the Public Health Service rating method. Lists of interstate milk shippers and their ratings, as reported by the State health
authorities and spot-checked by the Public Health Service, are issued
periodically by the Public Health Service for the information of receiving communities. These lists may be obtained either from the State
health authority or from the Public Health Service." For the history
and operation of the National Conference of Interstate Milk Shippers
which utilizes the rating system, see: National Conference on Interstate
Milk Shipments, Summary of Policies (Public Health Service Publication 1953); Surgeon General's Letter to all State Milk Control Authorities
(Dec. 31, 1946).
121 U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Federal Milk Marketing Orders (AMS Misc.
Pub. No. 732, Oct. 1956).
1227 C.F.R. § 935.5 (1955); 7 C.F.R. § 948.5 (1955); 7 C.F.R. § 1013.7, as published in 22 Fed. Reg. 2529 (1957).
123 Hamilton, Price and Price Policies 520 (1938).
124 Those reported not killed by pasteurization are staphyloccus enterotoxin,
which causes food poisonings, and possibly pasteurization does not destroy rickettsia, viruses, and Q fever. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Regulations Affecting the Movement and Merchandising of Milk 13 (A.M.S.
Market Research Report No. 98, 1955).
5
12 Fenzau and Van Arsdall, Economies in Farm Dairy Buildings and Equipment in Relation to Sanitary Quality of Milk 1, 5 (Agricultural Information Bull. No. 153 (1957)). On page 5 is noted, for example, that the
erection of a partition between the milking area and the milk handling
area did not improve the sanitary quality of the milk. When the partition did exist, no improvement in sanitary quality was noted by the addi-
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that a large amount (one plant reported 80% to 90%) of manufacturing quality milk would meet laboratory tests as Grade A milk,
but cannot be sold as Grade A quality because the barn and equipment do not comply with Grade A specifications.' 6
One tendency of these laws may be to drive the small farmer
out of the better-paying Grade A milk production, because he cannot stand the cost of the equipment, construction, and upkeep demanded. As stated above, no attempt is made to evaluate the merits
of the Grade A law. It is at present a nationally accepted standard
for dairy regulation. The State of Nebraska has adopted it, and
this paper merely attempts to show certain problems which have
attended the adoption of this law. It may be noted in passing, however, that one recent technological innovation has caused many
farmers in this area to cease production of Grade A milk. A drive
has been put on to convert all Grade A farms in the Omaha, Council Bluffs, and Lincoln milkshed to the use of bulk tanks on the
farm instead of milk cans and coolers. 1 2

This is not a formal re-

quirement for Grade A milk, but when the bulk tank was installed,
the health officials of at least the Lincoln milkshed demanded compliance with rigorous installation requirements which were al-

tion of a vestibule (short hall with door on each end to be sure one door
was always closed) between the milking area and the milk handling area.
The Public Health Service Code, p. 65, requires a room for the handling
of the milk which is separate from the milking area. If the barn is used
for cattle housing, a vestibule between the two areas must be constructed.
If the barn is used only for milking and feeding of concentrates, but not
for housing the cattle, the farmer is permitted to dispense with the vestibule "when a solid, self-closing door, opening outward from the milk
house, is provided." To the same effect, see Dahlberg, Adams and Held,
Sanitary Milk Control and Its Relation to the Sanitary, Nutritive, and
Other Qualities of Milk 121, 123 (National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Pub. No. 250, 1953). "The findings of this study
indicate the need for only a limited number of basic requirements to
insure a wholesome milk supply, as given below. Other conditions which
are required in many laws and ordinances may be desirable, but are
not essential.... The many details of sanitary milk production found in
some ordinances, including such items as detailed specifications for the
construction of barns and milk houses, feed storage arrangements, walkways, etc., may be very useful in promoting sanitary milk production
but, when used, they should be recommended only and not required."
126 Hillman, Rowell, and Israelsen, Barriers To The Interstate Movement of
Milk and Dairy Products in The Eleven Western States 68 (Ariz. Ag.
Exp. Station Bull. No. 255, 1954).
127 Conference with Dean James Doyle, College of Law, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska; attorney for the Nebraska-Iowa Non-Stock Cooperative Milk Association, July 24, 1957.
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most certain to entail additional expense.' 28 It is reported that of
an approximate 2,000 farmers in the Lincoln, Omaha, and Council
Bluffs milkshed who were already meeting the Grade A requirements, about 500 are ceasing
production of Grade A milk for failing
129
to convert to bulk tanks.
Having examined a number of problems attending the adoption of the Grade A law, a few recommendations for changes are
in order.
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES
The Nebraska Grade A law is almost certain to come up for
amendment in the 1959 legislative session. The 1957 bill was rushed
through at the last minute and contained a provision requiring the
dating of milk containers which the legislature intended to delete. 130 While in the process of amendment, it is suggested that the
following be considered:
USPHS MILK ORDINANCE AND CODE
The director is now authorized to adopt regulations for Grade A
products which comply generally with the 1953 edition of the
USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code.13 1 That publication is amended
from time to time. Furthermore, the Ordinance and Code adopts
by reference another publication entitled: "Standard Methods for
the Examination of Dairy Products.' 1 32 This, too, is subject to revision from time to time.
There are several ways to keep the Nebraska regulations current with amendments made in those two publications. As indicated
above, it would invite a holding of unconstitutionality to immediately adopt all future changes. One manner in which all doubt of
unconstitutional delegation of authority would be avoided would
be to require the director to submit a report detailing any amendments to the appropriate legislative committee at each regular
session of the legislature. The report should contain the director's
recommendations as to whether Nebraska should adopt the changes.
The law could be thus kept current (avoiding the fate of the Nebraska Pure Food Law) with no danger of an unconstitutional deleA.

ADOPTION OF THE
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Supra, notes 62, 64.

Supra, note 127.
Neb. Leg. J. 2011, 68th Sess. (1957).
131 Neb. Laws c. 370, § 1 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.02
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gation or abdication of authority. This would cause a time lag between the USPHS and the Nebraska adoptions, but it should not
be enough to cause any difficulty with the Grade A shipments in
interstate commerce. Even in 1958, the interstate milk ratings are
based on compliance with the 1939 edition of the USPHS Milk
1
Ordinance and Code and not on compliance with the 1953 edition. 33
It may be that the authority granted to the director by the state
statute to adopt regulations which "comply generally" with the
1953 edition of the USPHS publication is itself authority for the
director to adopt future amendments if he so chooses. If the legislature so intends, the director could be authorized to consider new
amendments as a standard in determining how his regulations
might differ from the 1953 edition. He might also be directed to
examine the amendments and to decide in each case whether he
will adopt the amendments. In light of the Nebraska position on
adoption by reference, however, this latter provision might be in
more danger of being held unconstitutional. The provision may be
held an improper standard because measured by the policy standard
of a foreign body and not that of the State.
It would also be prudent to set further standards surrounding
the power of the director to vary from the USPHS Milk Ordinance
and Code. Language authorizing the regulations adopted to comply
generally with the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code should be
amended to state that the regulations are to comply generally with
that publication, in light of the Nebraska statutes, but in no case
to be lower than those of the 1953 edition of the USPHS Milk
Ordinance and Code. This would have the effect of (1) providing
an additional standard which would lessen the possibility that the
court might find an unconstitutional delegation of authority for
lack of proper standards, and (2) granting authority to adopt regulations equally as high as the USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code,
though a general statute regarding milk might impose a lesser
standard. In order to ship freely under a Grade A label, Nebraska
standards must be "substantially equivalent" to USPHS recom13 4
mendations.
B.

STATE-MUNICIPAL

CONTROL

As outlined above, there is considerable difficulty presented
when the state and municipality both purport to maintain and enforce a complete system of dairy regulation within their respective
jurisdictions.
'33
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U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service,
Compliance Ratings of Interstate Milk Shippers (Jan. 1, 1958).
USPHS Milk Ordinance and Code § 11 (1953).
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Since the state has adopted the Grade A law, and machinery
is established to systematically enforce it, it becomes preferable
to exclude municipal regulation. There are, however, a number
of local enforcement agencies which the state officials have decided are doing an adequate job of enforcement. Rather than
destroy these bodies and replace them with state officials, it appears
more desirable to incorporate them into the state enforcement
system. To accomplish this, the following are recommended:
1. The statute should declare that the regulation of the dairy
industry is a matter of state-wide concern. This would, as far as
legislatively possible, subject home-rule cities to the same restrictions as non-home-rule cities.
2. It should be declared to be the intent of the legislature to
occupy the field of dairy regulation applicable to milk and milk
products, as defined, to the exclusion of all municipal regulation.
3. Local health officials who were properly enforcing a Grade
A milk regulation (as determined by the director) at the time the
mandatory Grade A law becomes effective should be permitted to
continue in operation, enforcing only official state regulations.
If it reasonably appears to the director that the local officials are
not adequately enforcing the state regulations, or are purporting
to enforce regulations other than those issued by the director, the
local officials must thereafter be forbidden to act, and the enforcement should be taken over by state officials.
4. Those cities which continue their inspection program will
have to pay their inspectors and should therefore receive the inspection fees. Under the system contemplated by the 1957 Act, the
milk plants pay an inspection fee of two cents per hundred pounds
of Grade A raw milk purchased. If the plant is certified on the
basis of a municipal license, the state charges an inspection fee of
only two-tenths of one cent per hundred pounds. 3 5 The latter sum
apparently represents the fees for the cost of the State's supervision of municipal officials. On that basis, all plants could be
charged two cents per hundred pounds, with all but the two-tenths
of one cent being paid to the municipality. It is not here represented that these figures are reasonable or even realistic inspection fees, but are used merely to illustrate on the basis of the
figures in present use.
C.

GRADE A AND OTHER NEBRASKA STATUTES

It perhaps would be advisable to completely re-cast the Nebraska dairy laws, but that is beyond the scope of this article. The
135 Neb. Laws c. 370, § 3 (1957), amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-263.07 (Supp.
1955).
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following are suggested to take care of obvious inconsistencies
between the general laws and the Grade A regulations. Part A
dealt with the case where statutory standards are lower than the
Grade A regulations. This section concerns State statutes more
strict than the Grade A provisions.
1. Foreign substances. Section 81-233(1) forbids the sale of
milk to which foreign substances have been added. The Grade A
regulations of Nebraska provide for the addition of flavoring, vitamins, minerals, and nonfat dry milk solids. No opinion is expressed
as to whether or not it should be permissible to add these items.
The statute and regulations should be clarified to either permit or
deny the addition. As it now stands there appears to be a flat
conflict.
2. Nonfat solids in skim milk. Section 81-233(4) requires
skimmed milk to contain 9.25 (nonfat) milk solids. Grade A regulations fix no set standards of nonfat milk solids in skimmed milk,
but provide that skimmed milk is milk with less than 3.25% milkfat. "Milk" need only contain 8.25% nonfat milk solids. 13 A single
standard should be set.
3. Bacteria. Section 81-233 (5) forbids the sale of milk or cream
containing or which has been exposed to any disease-producing bacteria. This, in its literal sense, is so broad as to be nugatory. The
Grade A laws permit up to certain maximum amounts of bacteria
to be present in milk, without distinguishing between the harmless
and the disease-producing variety. The latter approach is more
realistic.
4. Tuberculosis inspection. Section 81-235 (2) makes it unlawful to sell milk from an animal not examined and certified free of
tuberculosis within three years prior to the sale of the milk. This
should be expressly amended to provide that if the animal is located within a modified accredited tuberculosis free area, milk
may be sold from the animal upon only such inspection as is required by the director in conjunction with the accreditation program.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are no doubt other statutory provisions which could be
deemed inconsistent with the Grade A provisions. This study has
attempted to illustrate the most troublesome and most obvious problems which are caused by Nebraska's adoption of a Grade A dairy
law without adequate correlation to existing regulatory measures .
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